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Despite early jurisprudence to the effect that neither the European Con-
vention on Human Rights' nor the International Covenant on Civil and Po-
litical Rights2 protect a right of conscientious objection,3 cases continue to be
brought under both instruments alleging that refusal to allow objection to
military service is contrary to the guarantee of freedom of religion.' Constant
complaints by individuals before international organizations have thus en-
couraged States to recognize the right of conscientious objection in their leg-
islation and their practice. As the recent report of the United Nations Human
Rights Commission documents, not only is there a tendency towards abol-
ishing conscription, but the number of States in which provision is made for
civilian and or unarmed service in lieu of military service is also on the rise.6
* B.Sc.Soc. (Ottawa), LL.B (Ottawa), BCL (Oxford), JSD (U.C., Berkeley), Associate
Professor at the Faculty of Law, University of Ottawa (Canada).
1. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention].
2. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
[hereinafter International Covenant].
3. See, e.g., Grandrath v. Fed. Republic of Germany, 1967 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 626,
674 (Comm. of Ministers of the Council of Europe) (noting European Convention, under art.
4(3)(b), does not require recognition of the right of conscientious objection).
4. See European Convention, supra note 1, art. 9 ("Everyone has the right to freedom of
thought, conscience and religion") and under the International Covenant, supra note 2, art. 18
("Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion.").
5. The Question of Conscientious Objection to Military Service: Report of the Secretary-
General Prepared Pursuant to Commission Resolution 1995/83, U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n on
Hum. Rts., 53rd Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 23, 54, U.N. Doc. EJCN.4/1997/99 (1997).
6. See Civil and Political Rights, Including the Question of Conscientious Objection to
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While those who oppose military service might be encouraged by recent de-
velopments at the national or the international level, there is not yet have
cause to celebrate. The reality remains that conscription continues to be en-
forced by many States,' that conscientious objectors are still imprisoned for
refusing to perform military service, and that objectors can still lose their
citizenship rights for exercising their convictions.8 Furthermore, in those
countries where a right of objection is recognized, discrimination is often di-
rected against objectors for failure to perform their perceived duty.' We are,
therefore, still far from complete international acceptance of the principle
that all individuals should be entitled to take responsibility for their convic-
tions"0 and States should not purposely compel individuals to perform acts
which are contrary to their convictions."
In order to comprehend why so many States are reluctant to recognize a
full right of objection,"2 the issues surrounding such a right will be examined.
In the following pages, a review of the evolution of the concept of conscien-
tious objection will be undertaken, paying particular attention to the stan-
Military Service, Report of the Secretary-General Submitted Pursuant to Commission Resolu-
tion 1998/77, U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n on Hum. Rts., 56th Sess., Prov. Agenda Item 11(g), at
14, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/55 (1999) (noting that most countries have provisions for alterna-
tive non-combative service).
7. E/CN.4/1997/99, supra note 5, at 4-6. Even in States that have no conscription, the
issue of recognition remains important since enlisted persons can always develop objections
once they have joined the military service.
8. See Promotion, Protection and restoration of Human Rights at National, Regional,
and International Levels: Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of children: Human
Rights and Youth: Final Report on Human Rights and Youth, submitted by Mr. Dumitru
Mazilu, Special Rapporteur, U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n Hum. Rts., Subcomm'n on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 44th Sess., Prov. Agenda Item 17(a) 9 103, 106
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/36 (1992); Implementation of the Declaration on the Elimina-
tion of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief: report
submitted by Mr. Abdelfattah Amor, Special Rapporeur, in Accordance with Commission on
Human Rights Resolution 1996/23, U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n on Hum. Rts., 53d Sess., Provi-
sional Agenda Item 19, 21, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1997/91 (1996). See also Asbjcrn Eide &
Chama Mubanga-Chipoya, Conscientious Objection to Military Service, U.N. ESCOR, Sub-
comm'n. On Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, IN 115-16, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983/30/Rev. 1 (1983).
9. Eide & Mubanga-Chipoya, supra note 8, 121.
10. See Donald A. Gianella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Devel-
opment, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1381, 1412 (1967)(presenting the view that conscription of people
who do not wish to participate in war entails interference with their conscience).
11. See generally Theodore Hochstadt, Right to Exemption from Military Service of a
Conscientious Objector to a Particular War, 3 HARv.C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1 (1967); Russell
Wolff, Conscientious Objection: Time for Recognition as a Fundamental Right, 6 ASILS
INT'L L.J. 65 (1982); Harlan F. Stone, The Conscientious Objector, 21 COLUM. Q. 253 (1919);
Marie France Major, Conscientious Objection and International Law: A Human Right?, 24
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 349 (1992); and Emily N. Marcus, Conscientious Objection as an
Emerging Human Right, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 507 (1998).
12. See Eide & Mubanga-Chipoya, supra note 8, 91 143(e) indicating that while the right
of objection is gaining acceptance by some States, it is still not yet recognized by others. See
E/CN.4/1997/99, supra note 5, at 52 (Annex II) for a list of countries that do not, as of yet,
recognize a right of objection to military service.
2
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 32, No. 1 [2001], Art. 2
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol32/iss1/2
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION TO MILITARY SERVICE
dards and guidelines elaborated by the United Nations Human Rights Com-
mission, to the jurisprudence of the European Commission of Human Rights
and to the opinions of the Human Rights Committee.
Part I will address the issues surrounding the right to conscientious ob-
jection so one may comprehend why so many States are reluctant to recog-
nize a full right of objection. Part II will review the evolution of case law re-
garding conscientious objection, paying particular attention to the standards
and guidelines elaborated by the United Nations Human Rights Commission.
Part III will review conscientious objection in the European Convention on
Human Rights and decisions by the European Commission of Human Rights
and opinions of the Human Rights Committee. Part IV concludes the article.
I. MEMBER STATES ARE RELUCTANT TO RECOGNIZE FULL RIGHTS OF
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION
A. Recognition of the Right of Objection
Conscientious objectors are persons who, for reasons of conscience or
profound convictions,13 refuse to perform armed service." While a right of
objection is not explicitly protected within international instruments, 5 the
right to refuse military service is most often characterized as inherent in the
concept of freedom of thought, conscience and religion. 6 Such right is guar-
anteed in Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 7 Article
13. Conscientious beliefs are said to reflect "an individual's inward conviction of what is
morally right or morally wrong, and it is a conviction that is genuinely reached and held after
some process of thinking about the subject." Norman S. Reaburn, Conscientious Objection
and the Particular War, 43 AUST. L.J. 317, 319 (1969) (citing Grundal v. Minister of State for
Labor and National Service, Sup. Ct. of W. Austl., unreported judgment, Sept. 11, 1953).
14. See Eide & Mubanga-Chipoya, supra note 8, 153. See also Paul M. Landskroener,
Note, Not the Smallest Grain of Incense: Free Exercise and Conscientious Objection to Draft
Registration, 25 Val. U. L. Rev. 455, 457 (1991).
[Glenerally understood, conscientious objection to war describes a conscientious
or religious belief incompatible with participation in war. Conscientious objection
is not a monolithic ideology, however. Rather, the term describes a range of reli-
gious beliefs and attitudes that generally concern a person's relationship with the
State in time of war.
Id.
15. Matthew Lippman, The Recognition of Conscientious Objection to Military Service
as an International Human Right, 21 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 31, 43 (1990-91).
16. See generally Major, supra note 11, at 356-61.
17. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217(III)(A), U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., Part 1, at 74, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948). Article 18 states: "everyone has the right to
freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change religion or
belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to
manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance." Id.
20011
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18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights" and, Article 9
of the European Convention on Human Rights."
In Resolutions 1987/46,"0 1989/59," 1995/83," 1998/77,3 and 2000/34,24
the Commission on Human Rights specifically declared that the right to con-
scientiously object to military service constituted a legitimate exercise of the
right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. 5 The Human Rights
Committee, in General Comment 22, also maintained that while "[t]he
Covenant [did] not explicitly refer to a right to conscientious objection ...
such a right [could] be derived from Article 18, inasmuch as the obligation
to use lethal force may seriously conflict with the freedom of conscience and
the right to manifest one's religion or belief."6
The right of objection is also associated with the right to life, which is
guaranteed in Article 3 of the Universal Declaration, Article 6 of the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and Article 2 of the European
Convention on Human Rights. 7 The Commission on Human Rights, in
18. International Covenant, supra note 2, art. 18.
19. European Convention, supra note 1, art. 9.
20. Conscientious Objection to Military Service, Res. 1987/46, U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n
on Hum. Rts., 43d Sess., Supp. No. 5, 54th mtg., at 108, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1987/60 (1987).
21. Conscientious Objection to Military Service, Res. 1989/59, U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n
on Hum. Rts., 45th Sess., Supp. No. 2, 55th mtg., at 139, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1989/86 (1989).
22. Conscientious Objection to Military Service, Res. 1995/83, U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n
on Hum. Rts., 51st Sess., Supp. No. 4, 62d mtg., at 246, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1995/176 (1995).
23. Conscientious Objection to Military Service, Res. 1998/77, U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n
on Hum. Rts., 54th Sess., Supp. No. 3, 58th mtg., at 253, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/177 (1998).
24. Conscientious Objection to Military Service, Res. 2000/34, U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n
on Hum. Rts., 60th mtg., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2000/34 (2000).
25. In Resolution 1998/77, the Commission "Draws attention to the right of everyone to
have conscientious objections to military service as a legitimate exercise of the right to free-
dom of thought, conscience and religion, as laid down in article 18 of the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights and article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights." E/CN.4/1998/177, supra note 23, at 254 (emphasis in original). In his interim report
on the elimination of all forms of religious intolerance, Mr. Amor, a special rapporteur for the
Commission on Human Rights, also expressed the opinion that "absence of alternative service
or even of legal provisions recognizing the concept of conscientious objection [constituted) an
omission at variance with international law." Human Rights Questions: Human Rights Ques-
tion, Including Alternative Approaches for Improving the Effective Enjoyment of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms: Implementation of the Declaration on the Elimination of
All Forms of Religious Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, U.N.
GAOR, 51st Sess., Agenda Item 110(b), 1 34, U.N. Doc. A/51/542 (1996) (note from Secre-
tary-General) (citations omitted).
26. Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Hu-
man Rights Treaty Bodies, Int'l Hum. Rts. Instruments, General Comment 22, at 38, U.N.
Doc. HRI/GEN/l/Rev.3 (1997).
27. Eide & Mubanga-Chipoya, supra note 8, 44. The contention is that the right to life
includes within its scope the right not to be forced to take the life of others or, put differently,
that the right to life necessarily implies the right to refuse to kill: if international treaties "for-
bid individuals from engaging in arbitrary killing, conscientious objectors should not be pun-
ished for refusing to kill." Major, supra note 11, at 362. See also The Role of Youth in the
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Including the Question of Conscientious Objec-
tion to Military Service: Written statement submitted by the International Peace Bureau, U.N.
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Resolution 1989/59, recognized the right to life is closely associated with the
right of conscientious objection; "Mindful of articles 3 and 18 of the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights, which proclaim the right to life, liberty
and security of person and the right to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion ... [we] recognize[] the right of everyone to have conscientious ob-
jections.""8 The Commission also linked the right to life with a right of ob-
jection to military service in the preambular paragraphs of Resolution
1998/77.29
B. Implications of Recognition
Once a State acknowledges a right of objection to military service, it has
to delineate the contours of the right. In particular, the State must define the
circumstances or range of grounds under which the right may be claimed."
One issue, which States must address, is whether individuals can base their
opposition to military service on profound religious, moral, ethical, humani-
tarian, or similar convictions or, only on religious motivations.31 States must
be mindful of the position of the Commission on Human Rights that,
"[C]onscientious objection to military service derives from principles and
reasons of conscience, including profound convictions, arising from reli-
gious, moral, ethical, humanitarian or similar motives" and, the Commis-
sion's affirmation that whenever a right of objection is recognized there
should be no discrimination "between conscientious objectors on the basis of
their beliefs."32
ESCOR, Comm'n on Hum. Rts., 45th Sess., Agenda Item 15, at 2, U.N. Doc.
EICN.411989/NG0/71 (1989).
28. E/CN.4/1989/86, supra note 21, at 139, 141.
29. FJCN.411998/177, supra note 23, at 253.
30. As far back as 1981, the Commission on Human Rights, in Resolution 40, pointed to
the need for a better understanding of the circumstances under which military service might
be objected to on grounds of conscience. See The role of the Youth in the Promotion and Pro-
tection of Human Rights, Including the Question of Conscientious Objection to Military Ser-
vice, Res. 40, Conscientious Objection to Military Service, Res. 1987/46, U.N. ESCOR,
Comm'n on Hum. Rts., 37th Sess., Supp. No. 5, 1640th mtg., at 243, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1475
(1981).
31. While religious objectors base their opposition to war upon religious texts and the
teachings and philosophy of their religious affiliations, ethical objectors rely upon their own
morality and adopted system of ethics. See generally Lippman, supra note 15, at 31 (1990-
91); Marcus, supra note 11, at 539, and Note, Conscientious Objectors: Recent Developments
and a New Appraisal, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 1426, 1434 (1970).
32. E/CN.4/1998/177, supra note 23, at 254. The Human Rights Committee, in General
Comment 22, also expressed the opinion that once the right of objection is recognized, "there
shall be no differentiation among conscientious objectors on the basis of the nature of their
particular beliefs." HRI/GEN/l/Rev.3, supra note 26, at 39. See also Angelo Vidal d'Almeida
Ribeiro, Implementation of the Declaration on the Elimination of Allforms of Intolerance and
of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief U.N. ESCOR, 46th Sess., Agenda Item 24, [
113, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1990/46 (1990).
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One of the thorniest issues for States concerns whether they should ac-
knowledge the rights of partial objectors. Partial objectors are individuals
who believe in the possibility of a just war; they do not object to all wars of
all kinds or the use of violence in all situations.3 Partial objectors invoke a
right of objection only when they are convinced that the war in which they
are asked to serve is unjust in either aim or method.34 Most States are reluc-
tant to recognize the rights of partial objectors,35 since they do not appreciate
individuals criticizing and second guessing their involvement in a particular
military conflict.36 However, both the General Assembly37 and the Commis-
sion on Human Rights38 have recognized the validity of the notion of partial
objection.39
33. The idea that war can be morally acceptable only in certain circumstances emanates
from the concept of just war as developed by Christian theologicians. See Joachim Von Elbe,
The Evolution of the Concept of the Just War in International Law, 33 AM. J. INT'L L. 665,
678-79 (1939).
34. Based on standards of international or national law or morality, partial objectors be-
lieve that, "armed force may be justified under limited circumstances... Objection based on
reference to standards of international law may concern the purpose for which armed force is
used, or it may concern the means and methods used in armed combat." Eide & Mubanga-
Chipoya, supra note 8, 27.
35. See, e.g., E/CN.4/1997/99, supra note 5, at 31-37.
36. See generally Joseph E. Capizzi, Selective Conscientious Objection in the United
States, 38 J. OF CHURCH & STATE 339 (1996); Kent Greenawalt, All or Nothing at All: The
Defeat of Selective Conscientious Objection, 1971 SuP. CT. REv. 31; Major, supra note 11, at
352-56 (discussing the reasons advanced for non-recognition of the rights of partial objec-
tors).
37. Resolution 33/165 (20 December 1978) of the General Assembly provides that all
persons have the right to "refuse service in military or police forces which are used to enforce
apartheid." Status of Persons Refusing Service in Military or Police Forces Used to Enforce
Apartheid, G.A. Res. 165, U.N. GAOR, 33d Sess., Supp. No. 45, at 154, U.N. Doc. A/33/45
(1978).
38. In Resolution 1998/77, the Commission urged States "not to differentiate between
conscientious objectors on the basis of the nature of their particular beliefs."
E/CN.4/1998/177, supra note 23, at 254. It must be noted, however, that despite the fact that
the resolution stipulates that objection to military service can be derived from "principles and
reasons of conscience, including profound convictions, arising from religious, moral, ethical,
humanitarian or similar motives," it does not specifically refer to partial objectors. Id. (em-
phasis added).
39. See Eide & Mubanga-Chipoya, supra note 8, 19. In their report, Eide and
Mubanga-Chipoya recommended that States extend the right of objection to both absolute and
partial objectors. Their position was that:
(b) States should, as a minimum, extend the right of objection to persons whose
conscience forbids them to take part in armed service under any circumstances (the
pacifist position).
(c) States should recognize by law the right to be released from service in armed
forces that the objector considers likely to be used to enforce apartheid.
(d) States should recognize by law the right to be released from service in armed
forces that the objector considers likely to be used in action amounting to or ap-
6
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A second question that States must address is who shall make the final
determination of whether a valid claim for conscientious objection has been
presented. The issue is whether all claims of objection should automatically
be accepted as bona fide once they are formulated, or whether there should
exist some sort of inquiry into their validity. The argument for accepting
such claims as bona fide, is that, because it is practically impossible for any-
one to penetrate the conscience of an individual, a declaration setting out the
individual's motives should suffice to obtain conscientious objector status.'
The proposition that an inquiry should be made into the validity of a claim of
conscientious objection is defended on the basis that if no inquiry is made,
far too many individuals will invoke a right of objection."
Assuming that claims are to be reviewed, the next choice is whether
they should be scrutinized by military panels, by tribunals composed of mili-
tary and civilian personnel, or by civilian boards. 2 Deciding what type of
procedural system will be established for obtaining conscientious objector
status is important because the rules of procedure and of evidence vary
greatly depending on whether one is arguing before a military panel or a ci-
vilian board."3 While the Commission on Human Rights does not take a clear
stance on the issues of whether all objection claims should automatically be
accepted as valid without verification," or whether civilian panels must nec-
proaching genocide.
(e) States should recognize by law the right to be released from service in armed
forces that the objector considers likely to be used for illegal occupation of foreign
territory.
(f) States should recognize the right of persons to be released from service in
armed forces that the objector holds to be engaged in, or likely to be engaged in,
gross violations of human rights.
(g) States should recognize the right of persons to be released from the obligation
to perform service in armed forces that the objector considers likely to resort to the
use of weapons of mass destruction or weapons that have been specifically out-
lawed by international law or to use means and methods that cause unnecessary
suffering.
Id. 1 253(1). See also Amnesty International, Out of the Margins: the Right to Conscientious
Objection to Military Service in Europe, 1997 Report, EUR, 01/02/97, at *5, at
http://www.web.org/ai.nsf/index/eurOl0021997 (April 1997).
40. See, e.g., Statement of the International Humanist and Ethical Union.
E/CN.4/1990/46, supra note 32, 1 113; Lippman, supra note 15, at 35.
41. See Itzhak Kugler, On the Possibility of a Criminal Law Defense for Conscientious
Objection, 10 CAN. J. L. & JURISPRUDENCE 387, 435-38 (1997) (discussing how to best deal
with the problem of inappropriate claims of objection).
42. Eide & Mubanga-Chipoya, supra note 8, 101.
43. See id. 101-02. Civilian boards may also be more likely to recognize the validity
of objection claims than military tribunals. As Eide and Mubanga-Chipoya points out, tribu-
nals consisting only of "military personnel.., are often disinclined to allow for conscientious
objection." Id. 1 101.
44. See E/CN.4/1998/177, supra note 23, at 253. The Commission, however, "Welcomes
7
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essarily be the ones scrutinizing all claims, it does declare that all decisions
must be made by "independent and impartial decision-making bodies."45
States must also determine how they will deal with those individuals
that obtain the status of conscientious objector. Some of the issues which
must be addressed include: (1) whether objectors must perform alternative
services; ' (2) if alternative service is required, what forms of services will be
provided for; 7 (3) what should be the length of the alternative service-
should it be equal to, or longer than, military service; ' and (4) should objec-
tors receive the same remuneration for their services as conscripts.
On these matters, States can obtain guidance from Resolution 1998/77
of the Commission on Human Rights. The Commission recommended to
States, with a system of compulsory military service, "that they provide for
conscientious objectors various forms of alternative service which are com-
patible with the reasons for conscientious objection, of a non-combatant or
civilian character, in the public interest and not of a punitive nature."'49 The
Committee of Ministers, in Recommendation R(87)8,' also provided that:
the fact that some States accept claims of conscientious objection as valid without inquiry."
(emphasis in original). Id. In Recommendation No. R(87)8, the Committee of Ministers of the
Council of Europe also articulates that States can "lay down a suitable procedure for the ex-
amination of applications for conscientious objector status" or simply "accept a declaration
giving reasons by the person concerned." Communication on the Activities of the Committee
of Ministers, EuR. PARL. Ass., 39th Sess., Doc. 5725, at 10 (1987), reprinted in COUNCIL OF
EUROPE, COLLECTION OF RECOMMENDATIONS, RESOLUTIONS AND DECLARATIONS OF THE
COMMITrEE OF MINISTERS CONCERNING HUMAN RIGHTS 1949-1987, at 184-85 (1989).
45. E/CN.4/1998/177, supra note 23, at 254. See also the recommendation of the Parlia-
mentary Assembly of the Council of Europe that "where the decision regarding the recogni-
tion of the right of conscientious objection is taken in the first instance by an administrative
authority, the decision-making body shall be entirely separate from the military authorities,
and its composition shall guarantee maximum independence and impartiality." Council of
Europe, Twenty-ninth Ordinary Session of the Parliamentary Assembly (Second part, 5-13
Oct. 1977), Recommendation 816, in COUNCIL OF EUROPE, COLLECTED TEXTS 222 (1977).
Eide and Mubanga-Chipoya recommended that "[s]tates should maintain or establish inde-
pendent decision-making bodies to determine whether a conscientious objection is valid under
national law in any specific case. There should always be a right of appeal to an independent,
civilian judicial body." Eide & Mubanga-Chipoya, supra note 8, 1153(2)(a).
46. See Eide & Mubanga-Chipoya, supra note 8, 105. States that recognize a right of
objection usually require performance of alternative service. According to Eide and Mubanga-
Chipoya, the provision of alternative service fulfills two purposes for authorities. First, it im-
poses a burden on the objector, thus deterring those who, out of pure expediency, seek to be
released from military service. Secondly, it permits States to obtain from the objector a ser-
vice that is useful to the public interest. Id. 1106. See also E/CN.4/1997/99, supra note 5, at
41-46; CHARLES C. MOSKOS & JOHN WHrrECLAY CHAMBERS, THE NEW CONSCIENTIOUS
OBJECTION: FROM SACRED TO SECULAR RESISTANCE (1993).
47. Eide & Mubanga-Chipoya, supra note 8, 107. The three recognized categories of
alternative service are: (a) non-combat roles in the armed forces; (b) social ser-
vice/development service; and (c) peace-oriented service. Id.
48. When alternative service is provided, "an attempt is made to ensure that the burden
of the service is at least as onerous as military service would be, in order to preclude the
temptation to request alternative service for reasons of opportunism." Id. 33.
49. E/CN.4/1998/177, supra note 23, at 254. See also The Role of Youth in the Promo-
tion and Protection of Human Rights, Including the Question of Conscientious Objection to
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9. Alternative service, if any, shall be in principle civilian and in the pub-
lic interest. Nevertheless, in addition to civilian service, the state may also
provide for unarmed military service, assigning to it only those conscien-
tious objectors whose objections are restricted to the personal use of arms;
10. Alternative service shall not be of a punitive nature. Its duration shall,
in comparison to that of military service, remain within reasonable lim-
its; 1
11. Conscientious objectors performing alternative service shall not have
less social and financial rights than persons performing military service.
Legislative provisions or regulations, which relate to the taking into ac-
count of military service for employment, career or pension purposes shall
apply to alternative service."
States that recognize a right of objection must further adjudge whether
individuals who are already in the military are precluded from claiming a
right of objection. States must decide whether military personnel who de-
velop objections to military service during their involvement with the mili-
tary: (1) can seek reassignment to non-combatant duties; (2) can be dis-
Military Service: Written statement submitted by Friends World Committee for Consultation,
U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n on Hum. Rts., 47th Sess., Agenda Item 25, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1991/NGO/47 (1991) (suggesting that alternative service should never be of a puni-
tive nature).
50. COUNCIL OF EUROPE, supra note 44, at 185.
51. See also Report of the Committee on Civil Liberties and Internal Affairs on Consci-
entious Objection in the Member States of the Community, EuR. PARL. Doc. A3-0411/93, i
4 & 9 (Dec. 3, 1993), 1994 O.J. (C44) 103. Recently, the Human Rights Committee, while
examining the fourth periodic report from the Russian Federation, recommended that in States
where a right of objection was recognized, "every effort be made to ensure that reasonable
alternatives to military service be made available that are not punitive in nature or in length of
service." Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., Supp. No. 40, [
400, U.N. Doc. A/50/40 (1995). In examining the second periodic report of Cyprus, the
Committee also decreed that an excessive period of alternative service was not compatible
with the provisions of Articles 18 and 26 of the Covenant. See Report of the Human Rights
Committee, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Vol. I, Supp. No. 40, at 54-55, U.N. Doc. A/49/40
(1994). A similar holding can be found in Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N.
GAOR, 52d Sess., Vol. I, Supp. No. 40, at 64, U.N. Doc. A/52/40 (1997). In their report, Eide
& Mubanga-Chipoya also recommended that "states should provide alternative service for the
objector, which should be at least as long as the military service, but not excessively long so
that it becomes in effect a punishment." Eide & Mubanga-Chipoya, supra note 8, 153(3).
They also argued that "states should, to the extent possible, seek to give the alternative service
a meaningful content, including social work or work for peace, development and international
understanding." Id.
52. See also E.P. Res. A3-0411/93, supra note 51, 10. During adoption of the Interna-
tional Covenant, and more specifically, during discussion of Article 8 of the Covenant, pro-
posals to ensure that objectors receive the same pay as soldiers, were set aside. Annotations
on the Text of the Draft International Covenants on Human Rights, U.N. GAOR, 10th Sess.,
Annexes, Agenda Item 28, ch. VI, 23, U.N. Doc. A/2929 (1955). See also YORAM DINsTEIN,
The Right to Life, Physical Integrity, and Liberty, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS:
THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 114, 127 (Louis Henkin ed., 1981) (noting
the failure of a provision guaranteeing equal pay for alternative service under Article 8 of the
International Covenant).
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charged from the military; or (3) must continue to perform their duties. The
position of the Commission on Human Rights, 3 of the Human Rights Com-
mittee, 4 and of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe55 is that
all individuals, whether or not in the armed forces, must be allowed to in-
56,voke a right of objection.
One final issue, which States must determine, is whether they will grant
asylum to individuals who flee their country of origin because they have not
been granted exemption from military service. States must be mindful of Ar-
ticle 14 of the Universal Declaration, which affirms that "everyone has the
right to seek and enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution."57 States
must also consider General Assembly Resolution 33/165, which not only
recognizes the legitimacy of refusal to serve in military police forces used to
enforce apartheid, but also stresses the need for asylum for those compelled
to leave their country of origin for such refusal.58 In Resolution 1998/77, the
Commission on Human Rights also encouraged States: "subject to the cir-
cumstances of the individual case meeting the other requirement of the defi-
nition of a refugee as set out in the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of
Refugees,59 to consider granting asylum to those conscientious objectors
53. After stating that it was "Aware that persons performing military service may de-
velop conscientious objections," the Commission, in Resolution 1998/77, "[drew] attention to
the right of everyone to have conscientious objection." E/CN.4/1998/177, supra note 23, at
254 (emphasis in original).
54. The Human Rights Committee position is that an individual who wishes to claim the
status of conscientious objector should be able to do so at any time: whether it be before or
after entering the armed forces. See, e.g. Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N.
GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 37-38, U.N. Doc. A/51/40 (1996), and Report of the Hu-
man Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, 52d Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 64, U.N. Doc. A/52/40
(1997).
55. COUNCIL OF EUROPE, supra note 44, at 185. In Recommendation R(87)8, the
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe urged that the law "provide for the
possibility of applying for and obtaining conscientious objector status in cases where the
requisite conditions for conscientious objection appear during military service or periods of
military training after initial service." Id.
56. See The Role of Youth in the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Including
the Question of Conscientious Objection to Military Service: Written statement submitted by
Pax Christi International, a non-governmental organization in consultive status (category II),
U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n on Hum. Rts., 47th Sess., Agenda Item 25, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1991/NGO/48 (1991); and The Question of Conscientious Objection to Military Ser-
vice: Written statement submitted by Pax Christi International, a non-governmental organiza-
tion in special consultative status, U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n on Hum. Rts., 53d Sess., Agenda
Item 23, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1997/NGO/39 (1997).
57. Eide & Mubanga-Chipoya, supra note 8, 137.
58. A/33/45, supra note 37, at 154.
59. See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner For Refugees, Handbook On
Procedures and Criteria For Determining Refugee Status Under the 1951 Convention and the
1967 Protocol Relating To the Status Of Refugees, HCR/IP/4/Eng/Rev.1 (1979). The Hand-
book establishes standards for resolving some of the questions concerning conscientious ob-
jection and the right of asylum. The Handbook states that "[F]ear of prosecution and punish-
ment for desertion or draft-evasion does not in itself constitute well-founded fear of
persecution under the definition." Id. T 167. "A person is clearly not a refugee if his only rea-
10
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compelled to leave their country of origin because they fear persecution ow-
ing to their refusal to perform military service when there is no provision, or
no adequate provision, for conscientious objection to military service."'
II. THE EVOLUTION OF CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION BY THE U.N. HUMAN
RIGHTS COMMITTEE
In a number of decisions, the European Commission and the Interna-
tional Committee have set aside the claims of individuals who have asserted
a right of objection. Based on literal and formalistic readings of the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, both organizations have previously rejected the conten-
tion that a right of objection is encompassed within the protected right of
freedom of religion. Fortunately for objectors, both the Commission and the
Committee demonstrate a willingness to reconsider their initial rulings on
the subject.
A. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Human
Rights Committee
One international standard upon which the right to conscientious objec-
tion to military service can be founded is the right to freedom of thought,
son for desertion or draft-evasion is his dislike of military service or fear of combat." Id.
168. It also affirms, however, that,
the necessity to perform military service may be the sole ground for a claim to
refugee status, i.e. when a person can show that the performance of military ser-
vice would have required his participation in military action contrary to his genu-
ine political, religious or moral convictions, or to valid reasons of conscience.
Id. 170. The Handbook further maintains that where "[Tihe type of military action, with
which an individual does not wish to be associated, is condemned by the international com-
munity as contrary to basic rules of human conduct, punishment for desertion or draft evasion,
could... in itself be regarded as persecution." Id. 1 171. The Handbook concludes with the
proposition that "[I]t [is] open to Contracting States, to grant refugee status to persons who
object to performing military service for genuine reasons of conscience" Id. 173.
60. E/CN.4/1998/177, supra note 23, at 254. Eide and Mubanga-Chipoya noted that most
decisions concerning asylum were determined by political considerations and by the relation-
ship that existed between the country of asylum and the country from which the conscientious
objector had fled. Eide & Mubanga-Chipoya, supra note 8, 132. They recommended the
establishment of standards to ensure a "favorable attitude towards conscientious objectors re-
questing asylum in conformity with obligations under international law." Id. 1 153(5). See
also The Question of Conscientious Objection to Military Service, Written statement submit-
ted by the International Fellowship of Reconciliation, a non-governmental organization in
special consultative status, U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n on Hum. Rts., 54th Sess., Provisional
Agenda Item 22, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/NGO/22 (1998); and, Civil and Political Rights,
Including the Question of: Conscientious Objection to Military Service, Written statement
submitted by the Friends World Committee for Consultation (Quakers), a non-governmental
organization in special consultative status, U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n on Hum. Rts., 56th Sess.,
Provisional Agenda Item 1 (g), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/NGO/29 (2000).
11
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conscience and religion. Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights provides:
1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and re-
ligion. This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or
belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with
others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in wor-
ship, observance, practice and teaching.
2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to
have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice.
3. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be subject only to
such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect pub-
lic safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms
of others. 1
The debates surrounding the adoption of Article 18 seem to preclude the
possibility of claiming that a right of objection to military service is pro-
tected by the Covenant. Although the Philippines delegation proposed an
additional paragraph to the Convention which stated, "[p]ersons who con-
sciously object to war as being contrary to their religion shall be exempt
from military service," it was withdrawn prior to a vote on the issue. 2 While
an argument can be made that the reason why the proposed addition was
withdrawn was simply that its inclusion was unnecessary in light of the fact
that Article 18 already covered the matter6 3 the fact remains that when Arti-
cle 18 was adopted, very few States recognized a right of objection.
1. L.T.K. v. Finland
In L.T.K. v. Finland, the Committee made its first true pronouncement
on whether the Covenant guarantees a right of objection to military service.'
In 1982, the author of the communication, a Finnish citizen, had informed
the competent national authorities that, for serious moral considerations
based on his ethical convictions, he was unable to perform military service.'
61. International Covenant, supra note 2, art. 18.
62. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.161, 49-57 (1950). A proposal that no one should be re-
quired to do any act contrary to ones religious worship and observance was also set aside. See
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.116, at 10 (1949).
63. Lippman, supra note 15, at 44, 45.
64. L.T.K. v. Finland, Comm. No. 185/1984, Report of the Human Rights Committee,
U.N. GAOR, 14th Sess., Supp. No. 40 at 242, U.N. Doc. A/40/40 (1985). The issue of the
right of conscientious objection first arose in the case of Muhonen v. Finland, Comm. No.
89/1981, Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, 14th Sess., Supp. No. 40 at
164, U.N. Doc. A/40/40 (1985). However, the question of whether Article 18 of the Covenant
guaranteed a right of objection did not have to be determined by the Committee since the ap-
plicant had already obtained a remedy within his country.
65. L.T.K. v. Finland, Comm No. 185/1984 2.1.
12
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Instead of armed or unarmed military service, he offered to perform alterna-
tive service." After concluding that it had not been proven that serious moral
considerations based on an ethical conviction prevented the author from per-
forming armed or unarmed military service, the Military Service Examining
Board ordered him to perform armed service. 7 Despite this order, he refused
to perform any military duties. Court proceedings were then initiated
against him, and he was sentenced to eleven months imprisonment for his
refusal.69
Appearing before the Committee, the author argued that Finland had
violated Articles 18 and 19" of the Covenant by failing to recognize his
status as a conscientious objector.7' The Committee, however, rejected this
contention. After observing that the author of the communication was not
prosecuted and sentenced because of his beliefs or opinions, but because he
refused to perform military service, the Committee declared that the Cove-
nant "does not provide for the right to conscientious objection."72 The Com-
mittee's position was that neither Article 18 nor Article 19 of the Covenant
could be construed as implying a right of objection, especially when para-
graph 3(c)(ii) of Article 8 was taken into account. Article 8 paragraph
3(c)(ii) states, "forced or compulsory labor" did not include "any service of a
military character and, in countries where conscientious objection is recog-
nized, any national service required by law of conscientious objectors," was
taken into account.73 For this reason, the author's claim was declared incom-





69. Id. This decision was appealed, but the decision was upheld. At a later date, the au-
thor once again informed the authorities of his ethical convictions and of his desire to perform
only alternative service. The Examining Board, however, decided that it had not received suf-
ficient proof of his convictions.
70. International Covenant, supra note 2. Article 19 of the Covenant guarantees to eve-
ryone the right to freedom of opinion and expression. The right includes freedom "to hold
opinions without interference" and "to seek, receive and impart information and ideas...
through any other media" and "regardless of frontiers."
71. Muhonen v. Finland, Comm. No. 89/1981, Report of the Human Rights Committee,
U.N. GAOR, 14th Sess., Supp. No. 40 at 164, U.N. Doc. A/40/40 (1985).
72. Id. [5.2.
73. See also Karl Josef Partsch, Freedom of Conscience and Expression, and Political
Freedoms, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL
RIGHTS 211-212 (Louis Henkin ed., 1981). The author argues that since Article 8(3)(c)(ii)
provides that a State may require national civilian service instead of military service "in coun-
tries where conscientious objection is recognized," this "implies that States are free to recog-
nize or not to recognize conscientious objection to military service."
74. See E/CN.4/1997/99, supra note 5, at 12; and E/CN.4/2000/55, supra note 6, at 11.
As the Committee explained, this was not a case where the author alleged that procedural de-
fects in the judicial proceedings against him had occurred. If procedural defects had been pre-
sent, then the defects themselves could have constituted violations of the provisions of the
13
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2. Aapo Jarvinen v. Finland
In Aapo Jirvinen v. Finland,"6 the Committee reaffirmed its position
that, to fulfill its obligations under the Covenant, a State need not grant the
status of conscientious objector to individuals who refuse to perform military
services."' It also expounded on its understanding of the scope of Article 26
which guarantees that "all persons are equal before the law and are entitled
without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law."78 In Jiirvinen,
the problem was not that Finnish authorities did not recognize the validity of
conscientious objection claims. Rather, the concern was over the duration of
civilian service which had to be performed instead of military service. 9
While civilian service had recently been extended from twelve months to
sixteen months, the length of military service had remained at eight
Covenant. Muhonen v. Finland, Comm. No. 89/1981, 5.2. For argument that the Committee
should not have resolved the issue of compatibility of military service and freedom of con-
science at the admissibility stage, see Manfred Nowak, UN Human Rights Committee: Survey
of Decisions Given up Till July 1986, 7 HuM. RTS. L.J. 287, 303-04 (1986).
75. Muhonen v. Finland, Comm. No. 89/1981, 5.2.
76. Jgrvinen v. Finland, Comm. No. 295/1988, Report of the Human Rights Committee,
U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., Supp. No. 40, 6.1, U.N. Doc. A/45/40(1990).
77. Id. [ 6.2. See also Selected Decisions of the Human Rights Committee under the Op-
tional Protocol, Comm. No. 267/1987, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., Vol. 2, at 74, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/OP/2 (1990); and R.T.Z. v. Netherlands, Comm. No. 245/1987, Report of the
Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, 43d Sess., Supp. No. 40 at 265, U.N. Doc. A/43/40
(1988). The Committee observed that "the Covenant does not preclude the institution of com-
pulsory military service by State parties even though this means that the rights of individuals
may be restricted during military service, within the exigencies of such service" Id. 1 3.2.
78. International Covenant, supra note 2, art. 26:
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to
the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimi-
nation and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimi-
nation on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or
other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
79. Jairvinen v. Finland, Comm. No. 295/1988, N 2.1-2.2.
14
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months." The author's contention was that the prolonged civilian service
was unjustified and constituted discrimination."
In rejecting the author's claim, the Committee affirmed that, although
individuals in Finland had to perform military or alternative service, no vio-
lation of Article 8 of the Covenant existed. Article 8, according to the Com-
mittee, clearly stated, "'service of a military character' and 'national service
required by law of conscientious objectors' [did not constitute] forced or
compulsory labour."82 On the issue of whether the specific conditions under
which alternative service had to be performed constituted a violation of Arti-
cle 26, the Committee maintained that States could provide for longer peri-
ods of civilian service than military service without necessarily engaging in
discriminatory practices.83 While Article 26 prohibited discrimination and
guaranteed equal protection to everyone, it did not prohibit all differences of
treatment; differences based on reasonable and objective criteria were per-
missible. 4 The prolonged duration of civilian service was considered reason-
able and distinct because one was no longer required to prove to the exami-
nation boards that one's religious belief was genuine.85
3. J.P. v. Canada
In its subsequent decision dealing with the rights of objectors, the
Committee seemed to renegue slightly on its earlier stance that the right of
objection fell outside the confines of Article 18. In J.P. v. Canada,6 a mem-
80. Id. 2.2. Until the end of 1986, the duration of civilian service was twelve months.
To obtain conscientious objector status an individual had to submit a written application. The
genuineness of an applicant's conviction was reviewed by an examination board. At the end
of 1986, the duration of civilian service was extended to sixteen months but applicants were
assigned to civilian service solely on the basis of their own declaration. The ratio for the
amendment was explained as follows:
As the convictions of conscripts applying for civilian service will no longer be ex-
amined, the existence of these convictions should be ascertained in a different
manner so as not to let the new procedure encourage conscripts to seek an exemp-
tion from armed service purely for reasons of personal benefit or convenience. Ac-
cordingly, an adequate prolongation of the term of such service has been deemed




83. Despite its affirmation that the "Covenant itself does not provide a right to conscien-
tious objection," the Committee examined whether a violation of Article 26 had occurred. It
did so because of its position that the prohibition of discrimination under Article 26 was not
limited to the rights provided for in the Covenant. Id. 6.2.
84. Id. 16.3.
85. Id. 6.4-6.6. For criticism of the decision see BAHIYYIH G. TAHZIB, FREEDOM OF
RELIGION OR BELIEF: ENSURING EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROTECTION 283-84 (1996)
(arguing that "the exceedingly longer duration of alternative civil service" was punitive in na-
ture).
86. J.P. v. Canada, Comm. No. 446/1991, Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N.
15
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ber of the Quakers refused to pay a certain percentage of her taxes. Her posi-
tion was "that the Canadian Income Tax Act, insofar as it implied that a cer-
tain percentage of her assessed taxes went towards military expenditures,
violate[d] her freedom of conscience and religion."87 Despite deciding that
the claim was inadmissible because the refusal to pay taxes on grounds of
conscience fell outside the scope of Article 18,8" the Committee held that
"conscientious objection to military activities and expenditures" was "cer-
tainly" protected by Article 18.89
Further proof of the Committee's willingness to reconsider its position
that a right of objection could not be derived from Article 18 of the Cove-
nant came in the form of General Comment twenty-two.' Interjecting on the
scope of Article 18, the Committee stated:
Many individuals have claimed the right to refuse to perform military ser-
vice (conscientious objection) on the basis that such right derives from
their freedoms under article 18. In response to such claims, a growing
number of States have in their laws exempted from compulsory military
service citizens who genuinely hold religious or other beliefs that forbid
the performance of military service and replaced it with alternative na-
tional service. The Covenant does not explicitly refer to a right to consci-
entious objection, but the Committee believes that such a right can be de-
rived from article 18, inasmuch as the obligation to use lethal force may
seriously conflict with the freedom of conscience and the right to manifest
one's religion or belief.9'
The Comment also specified that when the "right [of objection] is rec-
ognized by law or practice, there shall be no differentiation among conscien-
tious objectors on the basis of the nature of their particular beliefs; likewise,
there shall be no discrimination against conscientious objectors because they
have failed to perform military service."
GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 434, U.N. Doc. A/47/40 (1992).
87. Id. 12.
88. For a similar conclusion see J.v.K. and C.M.G.v.K.-S. v. The Netherlands, Comm.
No. 483/1991, Hum. Rts. Comm., 45th Sess., at 435, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C45/D/483/1991
(1992). The Committee was asked to reconsider its position on the question of refusal to pay
taxes on grounds of conscience in a subsequent case, but declined to do so. K.V. and C.V. v.
Germany, Comm. No. 568/1993, Hum. Rts. Comm., 50th Sess., 3 & 4.3, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/50/D/568/1993 (1994). The European Commission on Human Rights has also de-
creed that the obligation to pay taxes is a general one, which has no specific conscientious
implications in itself. See generally C. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 10358/83, 37 Eur.
Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 142 (1983), and Hibbs & Birmingham v. United Kingdom, App.
No. 11991/86, Eur. Comm'n H.R. (1986).
89. J.P. v. Canada, Comm. No. 446/1991, 1 4.2. But see MANFRED NOWAK, UNITED
NATIONS COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: CCPR COMMENTARY 324 (opining that
the statement was merely an obiter dictum).
90. HRI/GEN/l/Rev.3, supra note 26, at 36.
91. Id. 11 .
92. Id.
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4. H.A.G.M. Brinkhof v. The Netherlands
In H.A.G.M. Brinkhof v. The Netherlands," the Committee had the op-
portunity to elaborate on its understanding of the principles contained in
General Comment twenty-two. In Brinkhof, the question before the Commit-
tee was whether a State, which recognizes the rights of objectors and which
provides an alternative obligation for them, can also establish an exception
to civilian service for a specified group without violating Article 26 of the
Covenant.94 The issue arose because, under Dutch law, Jehovah's Witnesses
were exempt from performing military service and from performing substi-
tute civilian service." The practical effect of the law was that, while a con-
scientious objector had to demonstrate the authenticity of his convictions and
could be prosecuted and sentenced to jail for refusing to perform alternative
service, a Jehovah's Witness was exempt from such obligations.96
In a somewhat convoluted decision, the Committee concluded that "the
exemption of only one group of conscientious objectors and the inapplicabil-
ity of exemption for all others" was unreasonable.97 Referring to its general
observations on Article 18, the Committee emphasized that when a State
recognizes a right of conscientious objection to military service, it must not
establish a distinction between objectors in relation to the nature of their re-
spective convictions.98 In light of the fact that States should grant the same
treatment to all persons who formulate objections of the same nature against
military and alternative service, the Committee recommended that the Dutch
government "review its relevant regulations and practices with a view to re-
moving any discrimination in this respect.""
In the end, however, the Committee decided that the author of the com-
munication, who had been jailed for refusing to obey military orders,"t° had
93. Brinkhof v. The Netherlands, Comm. No. 402/1990, Hum. Rts. Comm., 48th Sess.,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/48/D/402/1990 (1993).
94. Id. 3.3 & 3.4. This issue was raised, but not discussed, in Jarvinen v. Finland,
Comm. No. 295/1988, Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess.,
Supp. No. 40, 1 3.4, U.N. Doc. A/45/40 (1990).
95. To account for the special treatment reserved to Jehovah Witnesses, the State ex-
plained that "baptized members form a closed group of people who are obliged, on penalty of
expulsion, to observe strict rules of behavior." One rule which all members had to follow was
refusal to participate in any kind of military or substitute service. Brinkhof v. The Nether-
lands, Comm. No. 402/1990, 7.3. The State argued that membership in the group constituted
strong evidence that objection to military service and substitute service was based on genuine
religious convictions. Id. 9.2. The author of the communication maintained that the prepar-
edness of total objectors to go to prison constituted sufficient evidence of the sincerity of their
objections, and thus, that the differentiation in treatment between Jehovah's Witnesses and





100. Id. 2.1 - 2.2.
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not been the victim of a violation of Article 26. No violation had occurred,
for the claimant had not shown that his convictions as a pacifist were "in-
compatible with the system of substitute service in the Netherlands or that
the privileged treatment accorded to Jehovah's Witnesses adversely affected
his rights as a conscientious objector against military service.'' 1°
5. Westerman v. The Netherlands
In Westerman v. The Netherlands," the Committee once again had oc-
casion to apply the principles contained in Comment 22. In Westerman, the
author, who had been denied recognition as a conscientious objector by
Dutch authorities, 3 nonetheless refused to perform military duties."° Be-
cause of his refusal to carry out military orders, the author was charged, and
found guilty, under the Military Criminal Code. 5 Before the Committee, the
author advanced that the failure of the criminal courts to treat his conscien-
tious objections against military service as a justification for his refusal to
perform military service, and to acquit him, constituted a violation of Article
18 of the Covenant.' 6
The Committee, considering the alleged violation of Article 18 by the
Dutch Government, "observe[d] that the right to freedom of conscience does
not as such imply the right to refuse all obligations imposed by law, nor does
it provide immunity from criminal liability in respect of every such re-
fusal."'" After referring to General Comment 22, the Committee noted that,
under Dutch law, there existed a procedure for the recognition of conscien-
tious objection against military service."8 It was only after evaluation of all
101. Id. 9.3. For criticism of the "non-decision" of the Committee see Manfred Nowak,
The Activities of the UN Human Rights Committee: Developments from 1 August 1992 to 31
July 1995, 16 HuM. RTS. L.J. 377, 393 (1995) and Manfred Nowak, United Nations, 12
NETH. Q. Hum. RTS. 35, 36 (1994).
102. Westerman v. Netherlands, Comm. No. 682/1996, Report of the Human Rights
Committee, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., Supp. No. 40, vol. 2, at 41, U.N. Doc. A/55/40 (1999).
103. Id. ([i 2.1-2.7. Under Dutch law, those who have conscientious objections to per-
forming military service, may request recognition of these objections under the Military Ser-
vice (Conscientious Objection) Act. The Act defines conscientious objections "insurmount-
able objections of conscience to performing military service in person, because of the use of




106. Id. I 3.2.(arguing that, even though his objections were not recognised as conscien-
tious objections within the meaning of the Act, this did not signify that his objections were
not objections of conscience. The failure of the Criminal Courts to take his objections into
account constituted a violation of Article 18 of the Covenant).
107. Id. 19.3.
108. Id. 1 9.3. (referring to General Comment 22 which stipulates that a right of objec-
tion to military service can be derived from Article 18 and that the "obligation to use lethal
force may seriously conflict with the freedom of conscience and the right to manifest one's
religion or belief").
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relevant facts presented by the author that the State party concluded that he
had failed to demonstrate that an "insurmountable objection of conscience to
military service because of the use of violent means."'" There simply existed
no need for the Committee to substitute its own evaluation for that of the na-
tional authorities, especially in light of the fact that the Dutch legal provi-
sion, which recognised a limited right of objection, was compatible with Ar-
ticle 18 of the Covenant."'
In a separate dissenting opinion, Commissioner Solari Yrigoyen exam-
ined the limited grounds of objection recognised under Dutch law."' He
pointed out that, in times of peace, when violent means were not used, it was
virtually impossible for total objectors to be exempt from military service.
This was unfortunate for "even in peacetime, military service is connected
with war.""' In response to the author's argument that the sentence he re-
ceived violated his rights, Commissioner Solari Yrigoyen maintained that, in
light of the Committee's statement that conscientious objection to perform-
ing military service was a manifestation of freedom of thought, conscience
and religion, a violation of Article 18 of the Covenant had been estab-
lished."'
6. Foin v. France, Maille v. France, Venier & Nicolas v. France
In three recent decisions, the Committee re-examined the application of
Article 26 of the Covenant in relation to objectors. In Foin v. France,"4
Maille v. France"5 and Venier & Nicolas v. France,"6 the authors claimed
that the requirement, under French law, of twenty-four months for national
alternative service, rather than twelve months for military service, was dis-
109. Id.
110. Id. at 48. Commissioners Bhagwati, Henkin, Pocar, Medina-Quiroga and Scheinin
argued that the author's stated reasons for conscientious objection to military service demon-
strated that his objections constituted "a legitimate manifestation of his freedom of thought,
conscience or religion under article 18 of the Covenant." While the State party's arguments
could suffice to explain why the author's reasons did not constitute conscientious objection
under the State party's domestic law, "the State party ha[d] failed to provide sufficient justifi-
cation for its decision to interfere with the author's right under article 18 of the Covenant in
the form of denial of conscientious objector's status and imposing a term of imprisonment."
As paragraph 11 of General Comment 22 clearly spelled out, there must not be any differen-
tiation among conscientious objectors based on the nature of particular beliefs. The dissenters
thus found that the author was the victim of a violation of Article 18 of the Covenant. Id.
111. Id. at 49.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Foin v. France, Comm. No. 666/1995, Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N.
GAOR, 55th Sess., Supp. No. 40, vol. 2, at 31, U.N. Doc. A/55/40 (1999).
115. Maille v. France, Comm. No. 689/1996, Report of the Human Rights Committee,
U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., Supp. No. 40, vol. 2, at 63, U.N. Doc. No. A/55/40 (1999).
116. Venier & Nichols v. France, Comm. Nos. 690/1996 & 691/1996, Report of the Hu-
man Committee, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., Supp. No. 40, vol. 2, at 77, U.N. Doc. No. A/55/40
(1999).
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criminatory and violated the principle of equality before the law and equal
protection of the law as set forth in Article 26 of the Covenant." 7 Just as in
Jirvinen,"' the issue before the Committee was whether the specific condi-
tions under which alternative service had to be performed constituted a vio-
lation of the Covenant.
In the Foin decision, the Committee reiterated its position that Article
26 of the Covenant does not prohibit all differences of treatment: differentia-
tions based on reasonable and objective criteria are acceptable." 9 The Com-
mittee recognized that States can establish differences between military and
national alternative service and, that such differences may, in a particular
case, justify a longer period of service. Any differentiation, however, must
be "based on reasonable and objective criteria, such as the nature of the spe-
cific service concerned or the need for a special training in order to accom-
plish that service.' 2 ' The problem in the present cases was that France had
justified its difference of treatment on the ground that doubling the length of
service was the only way to test the sincerity of an individual's convic-
tions."2 Such argument clearly failed to meet the reasonable and objective
criteria requirement.'
2
The dissenters' believed that, in order to assess whether the differentia-
tion in treatment between the authors and those who served in the military
was based on reasonable and objective criteria, one must consider all the
relevant facts.'23 Specifically, one had to recognize that the conditions of al-
ternative service differed from the conditions of military service:
While soldiers were assigned to positions without any choice, conscien-
tious objectors had a wide choice of posts. They could propose their own
employers and could do service within their own professional fields. Fur-
thermore, objectors received higher renumeration than people servicing in
the armed forces ... [and] military service, by its very essence, carried
with it burdens that were not imposed on those doing alternative service,
such as military disciplines, day and night, and the risks of being injured
117. Foin v. France, Comm. No. 666/1995, 1 & 3.5; Maille v. France, Comm. No.
689/1996, %1  & 3.5; Venier & Nicols v. France, Comm. Nos. 690/1996 & 691/1996, 1 &
3.5. The authors also alleged a violation of Articles 18(2) and 19(1) of the Covenant.
118. Jarvinen v. Finland, Comm. No. 295/1988, Report of the Human Rights Committee,
U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., Supp. No. 40, 6.1, U.N. Doc. A/45/40(1990).
119. Foin v. France, Comm. No. 666/1995, 1 10.3.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 40. In dissent, members Ando, Klein and Kretzmer argued that States that
choose to exempt conscientious objectors from military service must be able to "adopt rea-
sonable mechanisms for distinguishing between those who wish to avoid military service on
grounds of conscience, and those who wish to do so for other, unacceptable, reasons." Id. 3.
One effective and non-intrusive way for States to determine the validity of conscientious ob-jection claims is by the imposition of longer service periods for those who apply for exemp-
tions. This approach is perfectly valid so long as the extra service demanded is not punitive,
that is, so long as it does not create a situation where real conscientious objectors are forced to
forego their objection. Id.
123. Id. 4.
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or killed during military manoeuvres or military action.
1 24
In the dissent's view, when all the circumstances were taken into con-
sideration, the author's argument that the difference of twelve months be-
tween military service and the service required of objectors amounted to dis-
crimination became unconvincing. ' Regardless, the Committee found "that
a violation of Article 26 ha[d] occurred since the author[s] w[ere] discrimi-
nated against on the basis of [their] convictions of conscience. '1 26
B. Admissibility Decisions
In a number of admissibility decisions, the Committee also established
that a person cannot claim to be a victim of a violation of Articles 6 '27 and
7128 of the Covenant, which protect the right to life and prohibit torture, by
merely referencing the requirement to do military service. '29 The Commit-
tee's position is that claimants cannot contest conscription by a mere asser-
tion that performing military service, which implies preparation for the use
of nuclear and other weaponry, inevitably forces them to become accessories




127. International Covenant, supra note 2, art. 6. Article 6 (1) states that "Every human
being has the inherent right to life," that the "right shall be protected by law" and that "no one
shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life." Id. art. 6(1). Article 6(3) affirms that,
when deprivation of life constitutes the crime of genocide, it is understood that
nothing in this article shall authorize any State Party to the present Covenant to
derogate in any way from any obligation assumed under the provisions of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.
Id. art. 6(3). In General Comments 6 and 14, the Committee explained that Article 6 encom-
passes both a negative right to life against a State party, and a positive right. General Com-
ments 6 & 14, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/l/Rev.3, supra note 26, at 6, 18 (1997). In Comment 6,
the Committee affirmed that:
[W]ar and other acts of mass violence continue to be a scourge of humanity and
take the lives of thousands of innocent human beings every year. Under the Char-
ter of the United Nations the threat or use of force by any State against another
State, except in exercise of the inherent right of self-defense is already prohibited.
The Committee considers that States have the supreme duty to prevent wars, acts
of genocide and other acts of mass violence causing ... loss of life. Every effort
they make to avert the danger of war.., and to strengthen international peace and
security would constitute the most important condition and guarantee for the safe-
guarding of the right to life.
Id. at 6.
128. International Covenant, supra note 2, art. 7. Article 7 states that "no one shall be
subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." Id.
129. See, e.g., J.P.K. v. The Netherlands, Comm. No. 401/1990, U.N. Doc. A/47/40, at
401 and T.W.M.B. v. The Netherlands, Comm. No. 403/1990, U.N. Doc. A/47/40, at 406.
130. See, e.g., Brinkhof v. The Netherlands, Comm. No. 402/1990, 6.2 and A.R.U. v.
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military service on the basis that it places their life, and the lives of others, in
jeopardy.1 3' This is despite General Comment 14 which affirms the "produc-
tion, testing, possession, deployment and use of nuclear weapons should be
prohibited and recognized as a crime against humanity." 32
III. CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION IN THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
Article 9 of the European Convention provides:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion;
this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom,
either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to mani-
fest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.
2. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to
such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic
society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order,
health or morals, or for the rights and freedoms of others.
33
Although Article 9, at first glance, may appear to grant a right of con-
scientious objection, it must be read and interpreted in light of Article 4 ."
Article 4(3)(b) makes express reference to conscientious objectors and pro-
vides, "for purposes of this article, the term 'forced or compulsory labor'
shall not include ... in countries where a right to objection is recognised,
service exacted [from conscientious objectors] instead of compulsory mili-
tary service. '
A. Grandrath v. Federal Republic of Germany
The question of the right to conscientious objection to military service
was examined by the European Commission in Grandrath v. Federal Repub-
the Netherlands, Comm. No. 509/1992, U.N. Doc. A/49/40, at 327.
131. Id. In A.R. U. v. Netherlands, the author contended, "[Mlilitary service in the Neth-
erlands, within the framework of the defense strategy of the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion (NATO), which is based on the threat with and use of nuclear weapons, violated Articles
6 and 7 of the Covenant." Id. 1 3.1. His position was "[b]y doing military service, his life
[was] endangered, because of the measures of retaliation in case of the use of nuclear weap-
ons by NATO." Id. 1 3.2. "He also submits that the use of nuclear weapons by NATO,
through its consequences such as a fall-out and nuclear winter, directly affected his right to
life and his right not to be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment."
Id. The Committee, however, rejected all arguments. Id. 4.2.
132. U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/l/Rev. 3, supra note 26, at 19.
133. European Convention, supra note 1, at 4.
134. See FRANcis G. JACOBS & ROBIN C. A. WHITE, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS 217 (2d ed. 1996). The author explains that under one interpretative principle
the Convention must be read as a whole. As a result, each article of the convention must be
interpreted in light of the other articles. Id.
135. European Convention, supra note I, at 2 (emphasis added).
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lic of Germany. 36 In Grandrath, a German citizen, who was a Bible-study
leader in a congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, had been recognized by the
national authorities as a conscientious objector.'37 Although he was required
to perform substitute civilian service, he was given the opportunity to apply
for exemption or postponement of such service. The national authorities,
however, rejected his claim of exemption.' When he refused to perform his
obligations on grounds of conscience, criminal proceedings were instituted
against him, and he was convicted and ultimately sentenced to prison. 39
Before the Commission, the applicant alleged that Article 9 of the Con-
vention was breached because he was not exempted from substitute civilian
service." On its own motion, the Commission considered whether the
claimant had been subject to discrimination under Article 14,"' in conjunc-
tion with Article 9 or Article 4." Under German law, ordained Evangelical
or Roman Catholic ministers were exempt from military and alternative ser-
vice. On the other hand, ministers of other religions were exempt only if the
ministry was their principal occupation and only if their functions were
equivalent to those of ordained Evangelical or Roman Catholic Ministers.""
The Commission first distinguished the issues of religion and con-
science under Article 9. The Commission stated the civilian service, which
the applicant was required to perform, would not restrict his right to manifest
his religion, because it would not interfere with the private and personal
practice of his religion or with his duties to his religious community.'" On
the question of conscience, whether Article 9 was violated because the
claimant had been required to perform a service contrary to his conscience or
religion, the Commission referred to Article 4(3)(b) of the Covenant and
held:
[A]s in this provision it is expressly recognized that civilian service may
be imposed on conscientious objectors as a substitute for military service,
it must be concluded that objections of conscience do not under the Con-
vention, entitle a person to exemption from such service.'Z5
136. Grandrath v. Fed. Republic of Germany, 1967 Y.B. Eur. Cony. on H.R. 626
(Comm. Of Ministers of the Council of Europe).
137. Id
138. Id.
139. Id. at 628.
140. Id. at 630.
141. Article 14 provides that "the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms" set forth in the
Convention are to be "secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a na-
tional minority, property, birth or other status." European Convention, supra note 1, at 5.
142. Grandrath v. Fed. Republic of Germany, 1967 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. at 630.
143. Id. at 656.
144. Id. at 672.
145. Id. at 674. See JAMEs E.S. FAWCETT, THE APPLICATION OF THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTs 241 (2d ed. 1987). As Fawcett explains, "had there been no
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In these circumstances, the Commission finds it superfluous to examine
any questions of the interpretation of the term "freedom of... conscience
and religion" as used in Article 9 of the Convention.'"
The Commission made two important affirmations in relation to Article
14 of the Covenant. First, the Commission affmned the application of Arti-
cle 14 did not depend upon a previous finding that another article of the
Convention had been violated. 7 In certain cases, Article 14 could be vio-
lated in a field dealt with by another article of the Convention, despite being
no violation of that other article:
[I]n the present case, it is necessary to refer to the limitative provisions
contained in various Articles of the Convention. For example, in each of
Articles 8 to 11, a certain right is guaranteed by paragraph (1), but the
Contracting Parties are, under paragraph (2), allowed, subject to specific
conditions to restrict that right. When using this power to restrict a right
guaranteed by the Convention, the Contracting Parties are bound by the
provisions of Article 14. Consequently, if a restriction which is in itself
permissible under paragraph (2) of one of the above Articles, is imposed
in a discriminatory manner, there would be a violation of Article 14 in
conjunction with the other Article concerned. The situation under Article 4
is similar. Although the types of work and service, enumerated in para-
graph (3) are not expressly described as exceptions to the general prohibi-
tion against "forced labour," they nevertheless operate as such in the pre-
sent context.
4 8
When the provisions are considered from this point of view, it follows that
the limitations permitted, particularly by any national legislation concern-
ing compulsory military service and substitute service by conscientious
reference in Article 4(3)(b) to conscientious objection to compulsory military service, it could
have been argued that, while such service is not forced labour contrary to Article 4, it is still
contrary to Article 9(1) if imposed on conscientious objectors." Id. However, "since Article
4(3)(b) refers to conscientious objectors in terms which plainly imply that contracting States
are not bound to recognize it, compulsory military service is an exception to Article 9(1) as
well as Article 4." Id. Therefore, "it follows afortiori that substitute civilian service is also an
exception." Id.
146. Grandrath v. Fed. Republic of Germany, 1967 Y.B. Eur. Cony. on H.R. at 674. In
an individual opinion, Commissioner Eustathiades argued that "[w]here a 'service exacted
instead of compulsory military service' was imposed so as to interfere with the right guaran-
teed by Article 9 of the Convention, it was not permissible to exclude from consideration any
of Articles 4, 9 and 14. Id. at 690. Article 9 of the Convention was applicable in the present
case since the applicant's objections regarding the legality of the service which was a substi-
tute for military service were connected with his religious convictions. Id. Commissioner
Eustathiades, however, "hesitated" to conclude that the Convention had been violated in this
case: "in regard to the limitations laid down in Article 9, paragraph (2), the margin of appre-
ciation which is given to the Government concerned is extended as a result of Article 4, para-
graph (3)(b), of the Convention." Id. at 692-93.
147. Id at 678.
148. Id. The Commission's position was that while Article 14 did not presuppose a
breach of the other provisions of the Convention, there could be no room for its application
unless the facts at issue fell within the ambit of one or more of the latter. Id
24
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objectors, must satisfy the requirements of Article 14, that is to say, be
non-discriminatory both in their character and in their application.
49
Secondly, the Commission affirmed that only those differences of
treatment of persons in similar situations which had no objective and reason-
able justification qualified as discriminatory under Article 14.
The Commission concluded, on the issue of whether Article 14 in con-
junction with Article 4 of the Convention had been violated, that while there
was no question the German legislation on compulsory service differentiated
between ministers of different religions,' 1 such difference in treatment did
not amount to discrimination in violation of Article 14. Adoption of the lim-
ited exemption was motivated by a wish on the part of German authorities
"to prevent large-scale evasions of the duty to perform military service."'
52
The Commission continued:
In implementation of this basic purpose [to prevent evasion of military
duty] the law laid down such criteria that those ministers-and those
only-whose functions require their constant and continual attendance at
their ministerial office, would be exempt from compulsory service...
[T]he real basis of the distinction made by [the law] is in the function per-
formed by different categories of ministers and is not according to the re-
ligious community to which they belong.'"
For these reasons, the criteria adopted in the German law were not dis-
criminatory within the meaning of Article 14: they constituted a differentia-
tion which had to be considered "to be reasonable and relevant, having re-
gard, on the one hand, to the necessity of maintaining the effectiveness of
the legislation regarding compulsory service and, on the other hand, the need
of assuring proper ministerial service in religious communities. " "
149. Id. at 680.
150. Id. at 680-82. According to the Commission:
The notion of discrimination between individuals implies a comparison between
two or more different groups or categories of individuals and the finding that one
group or category is being treated differently from-and less favorably than-
another group or category and, secondly that such different treatment is based on
grounds which are not acceptable.
Id. at 680.
151. Id. at 682.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 682-84.
154. Id. at 684. In addition to concluding that the German law was not discriminatory,
the Commission also stated that the law was not applied in a discriminatory fashion with re-
gard to the Applicant:
The Applicant has himself stated that at the relevant time he had a full-time em-
ployment as a painter's assistant and that he exercised his ministerial functions in
his spare time. It is therefore clear that the Applicant's ministry was not his princi-
pal function and that, for this reason alone, he was not entitled to exemption under
2001]
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The Commission also expressed the opinion that there was not a viola-
tion of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 9 of the Convention. [I]t has
not been established that the Applicant had been subjected to a treatment
which was in any way less favourable than that accorded to ministers of
other religious communities." 155 Furthermore, because the applicant's allega-
tion that he had been required to perform a compulsory service which was
contrary to his conscience or religion only raised issues under Article 4 of
the Convention, there was no need to examine the question of discrimination
in relation to Article 9.156
B. X v. Austria
In X v. Austria," the Commission once again examined the issue of
conscience and military service. The applicant, convicted for refusing to
serve in the military, claimed that as a Roman Catholic, it was impossible for
him to serve as an armed combatant. He alleged the national authorities vio-
lated his right to freedom of conscience. 
5 1
In order to decide if a right of conscientious objection fell within the
purview of Article 9, the Commission once again affirmed it had to take
cognizance of Article 4(3)(b). In the Commission's view, the inclusion of
the words "in countries where they are recognized" was intended to leave a
choice to the contracting parties as to whether to recognize conscientious ob-
jectors and, in case of recognition, whether to provide for some form of sub-
stitute service.'" Not only did Article 9, as qualified by Article 4(3)(b), not
impose on States an obligation to recognize conscientious objection, but
States which failed to recognize conscientious objectors could choose to
punish those who refused military service."W
Article II of the German Act. It results from this that the Applicant cannot be con-
sidered to have been the victim of a discriminatory treatment in the application of
the German law.
Id. (emphasis omitted). See JACOBS & WHITE, supra note 134, at 219-20 and Van Dijk
& Van Hoof, Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights 541
(1990) for criticism of the Commission's decision. See X v. The Federal Republic of
Germany, App. No. 7705/76, 9 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 196 (1977) and
Johansen v. Norway, App. No. 10600/83, 44 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 155
(1985) for reaffirmation of this decision.
155. Grandrath v. Fed. Republic of Germany, 1967 Y.B. Eur. Cony. on H.R. 626, 688
(Comm. of Ministers of the Council of Europe).
156. Id. at 168.
157. X v. Austria, App. No. 5591/72, 43 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 161 (1973).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. See also Johansen v. Norway, App. No. 10600/83, 44 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. &
Rep. 155 (1985); Conscientious Objectors v. Denmark, App. No. 7665/76, 9 Eur. Comm'n
H.R. Dec. & Rep. 117, 118 (1977); A. v. Switzerland, App. No. 10640/83, 38 Eur. Comm'n
H.R. Dec. & Rep. 219, 222-23 (1984).
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C. Johansen v. Norway and Autio v. Finland
In a number of decisions, the Commission expounded on its understand-
ing of the rights and obligations of States that recognize a right of objection.
In Johansen v. Norway, 6' the Commission rejected the applicant's claim
that his detention for refusal to perform civilian service 62 violated his rights
under Articles 5 and 9163 of the Convention. The Commission affirmed that
"the Convention does not prevent a State from taking measures to enforce
performance of civilian service, or from imposing sanctions on those who
refuse such service.""' In Autio v. Finland,"6 where the applicant com-
plained over the length of his substitute service, the Commission also ruled
that where a State decides to provide alternative service for recognized ob-
jectors, it does not necessarily violate Article 14 in conjunction with Article
9 by providing for a longer period of civilian service than for military con-
scription.'
Despite reaffirming that neither the right of conscientious objection to
military service nor substitute service were guaranteed by the Convention,'67
the Commission in Autio ruled that the complaint fell within the scope of Ar-
ticle 9, and therefore Article 14 of the Convention was applicable.68 Finnish
161. App. No. 10600/83,44 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 155 (1985).
162. Conscientious objection to the performance of military service was recognized in
Norwegian legislation. While objectors could apply for civilian service instead of military
service, there was no possibility of exemption from both military and civilian service, except
for medical reasons. Id. at 158-59. Two different kinds of remedies could be applied, either
separately or in conjunction with each other, to persons who refused to discharge their civilian
obligations. Section 19 of the Act on Exemption from Military Service provided that a person
who was liable to perform civilian service but who refused to present himself or to comply
with orders given to him, could be sentenced to a fine or to imprisonment for not more than
three months. Id. at 157. As for Section 20, it provided that a person who refused to perform
civilian service could be placed at a special camp or at an institution under the Prison Admini-
stration in order to spend the period of service at that camp or institution. Id. Before it was
decided to place a person at such camp or institution, it had to be established through a judg-
ment by a court that the legal conditions of Section 20 were fulfilled. Id. In the present case,
the applicant was not prosecuted on the basis of Section 19 of the Act, but proceedings were
brought against him before the Tune District Court in order to have a decision by the Court
that the conditions for the application of Section 20 of the Act were fulfilled. Id. at 158.
163. While realizing that the Convention did not entitle him to exemption from civilian
service and did not prevent the Norwegian State from imposing sanctions on him for failure to
perform such service, the applicant nonetheless maintained that since the possible sanctions
were such as to force him to do exactly what his conscience forbade him to do, a violation of
Article 9 of the Convention excised. Id. at 161.
164. Id. at 165.
165. Autio v. Finland, App. No. 17086/90, 72 Eur. Cormm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 245
(1991).
166. Id. at 250. See also Johansen v. Norway, App. No. 10600/83, 44 Eur. Comm'n H.R.
Dec. & Rep. 155 (1985); Conscientious Objectors v. Denmark, App. No. 7665/76, 9 Eur.
Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 117, 118 (1977); A. v. Switzerland, App. No. 10640/83, 38 Eur.
Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 219, 222-23 (1984).
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law extended the length of substitute service from twelve to sixteen months
when the compulsory military service was only eight months. 69 The differ-
ence in treatment, between those who opted for substitute service and those
who engaged in military service, was not deemed discriminatory because
there was an objective and reasonable justification for such differentiation. 7 '
The longer period of civilian service was adopted to discourage conscripts
from seeking exemptions for reasons of personal benefit or convenience
(thus fulfilling the legitimate aim). 7 ' The prolonged civilian service concur-
rently removed an objector's obligation to convince examining boards of the
genuineness of the objector's beliefs (thus fulfilling the requirement of pro-
portionality).'
D. N. v. Sweden
In N. v. Sweden, "' the Commission also expressed the opinion that it
was not discriminatory to limit exemption from military and substituted ser-
vice to conscientious objectors belonging to a religious community."' While
all males were subject to military service under Swedish law, conscripts
could apply for substitute non-armed service'75 or for exemption from mili-
tary service. "Section 46 of the Swedish Conscript Act required as a condi-
tion for not being called up for service that a person be affiliated to a reli-
gious community and that, in view of this affiliation, it can be assumed that
he will not perform any service.' '7 6 The applicant alleged a violation of Arti-
cle 14 in conjunction with Article 9 in that he, being a total resister for phi-
losophical reasons, was not exempted from military service but sentenced to
imprisonment for refusal to discharge the service, while members of Jeho-
vah's Witnesses, a religious sect, were automatically exempted from military
service and thus not sentenced."7
After concluding the applicant's complaint fell within the realm of Arti-
cle 9 of the Convention, "8 the Commission made general comments regard-
ing the practice of conscription. It observed, "any system of compulsory
military service imposes a heavy burden on the citizens. This burden will be
169. Id. at 246-47.
170. Id. at 250.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. N. v. Sweden, App. No. 10410/83, 40 Eur. Comnm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 203 (1984).
174. Id. at 207.
175. Id. at 205. Conscripts who, for reasons of conscience or religion, objected to serving
in the army, were allowed to perform substitute non-armed service. Id. Provisions for substi-
tute service were laid down in the Act on Non-Armed Conscript Service. ld.
176. N. v. Sweden, App. No. 10410/83, 40 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 203, 207
(1984). Although in practice this exception was only applied to Jehovah's Witnesses, the law
did not exclude its application to other religious sects having similar views. Id.
177. Id. at 206.
178. Id. at 207.
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regarded as acceptable only if it is shared in an equitable manner and if any
exemptions from the duty to perform [such] service are based on solid
grounds.""' 9 The Commission pointed out that if some citizens were ex-
empted without compelling justification, questions of discrimination could
be alleged.'80 In light of these considerations, "[I]t is understandable, there-
fore, if national authorities are restrictive in exempting total resisters from
any kind of service, the purpose being to avoid the risk that individuals who
simply wish to escape service could do so by pretending to have objections
of conscience against compulsory service in general.....
The Commission found the differential treatment between the applicant
and members of Jehovah's Witnesses, as regards to the practice to call up for
military service and the consequences for failure to discharge those duties,
was objectively and reasonably justified under Article 14 of the Conven-
tion. 82 The Committee's decision was based on several facts: (1) Jehovah's
Witnesses are required to live by exhaustive set of behavioral rules; (2)
These rules are enforced with "strict informal social control amongst mem-
bers;" '83 and (3) one of these rules required the rejection of military and sub-
stitute service.84 Thus, membership constituted "strong evidence" that objec-
tions to compulsory service were based on "genuine religious
convictions."' As the Commission explained:
[M]embership of such a religious sect as Jehovah's Witnesses is an objec-
tive fact which creates a high degree of probability that exemption is not
granted to persons who simply wish to escape service, since it is unlikely
that a person would join such sect only for the purpose of not having to
perform military or substitute service. The same high probability would
not exist if exemption was also granted to individuals claiming to have ob-jections of conscience to such service or to members of various pacifist
groups or organizations.1
8 6
E. Suter v. Switzerland and Raninen v. Finland
Allegations of discrimination were also raised in Suter v. Switzerland 187







185. Id. at 208.
186. ld.
187. Suter v. Switzerland, App. No. 11595/85, 51 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 160
(1986).
188. Raninen v. Finland, App. No. 20972/92, 85 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 17
(1996).
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tion between those who refused to perform military service for other than
moral or religious reason, and religious objectors.'89 The applicant argued
that mere objectors could be imprisoned up to three years, conscientious ob-
jectors were only "liable to a term of imprisonment not exceeding six
months or a period of close arrest ranging from one day to three months.'
90
The Commission rejected the applicant's alleged violation of Article 14, in
conjunction with Article 9 of the Convention, for a number reasons. The
Commission found:
The legal requirement that a conscientious objector should act as a result
of a serious moral dilemma in order to receive a lighter penalty is objec-
tive and reasonable. In addition, the penalties prescribed by law in respect
of the two categories of conscientious objectors are proportionate to each
other. 19'
In Raninnen, the applicant contended that a violation of Article 14 in
conjunction with Article 9 existed because conscripts who initially stated an
absolute objection to all compulsory service suffered a harsher penalty than
those who began civilian service and then declared an absolute objection' 92
Finnish law allowed conscripts to choose either armed or unarmed military
service, or substitute civilian service."' Individuals who opted for civilian
service and subsequently refused to perform compulsory service, were pun-
ished less severely than objectors who expressed their opposition to both
military and civilian service at the outset 9 4 Because he refused to perform
any kind of service, the applicant was incarcerated on numerous occasions.'"
After confirming the present complaint fell within the realm of Article 9
of the Convention, 96 and that the applicant had been subjected to differential
treatment, 97 the Commission concluded the differential treatment, in light of
the "State's margin of appreciation... the differential treatment ... was ob-
jectively and reasonably justified.'98 The applicant's aggregated prison sen-
189. Suter v. Switzerland, App. No. 11595/85, at 164.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Raninen v. Finland, App. No. 20972/92, at 27.
193. Id. at 24.
194. Id. at 24-25.
195. Id. at 18-24.
196. Id. at 30. Despite finding no violation of Article 4 of Protocol 7, the Commission
also accepted that the present complaint of discrimination fell within the ambit of that provi-
sion. Id.
197. Id. at 31. The Commission considered that, for the purposes of Article 14, the appli-
cant was in a situation comparable to that facing total objectors who expressed their objec-
tions at later stages. ld. In App. No. 24630/94, the Commission had previously decided that
the situation of total objectors (those refusing to perform both military and substitute civilian
service) could not, for the purposes of Article 14 of the Convention, "be regarded as compa-
rable to that of conscientious objectors who are prepared to fulfill their military obligations by
opting for substitute civilian service." Id.
198. Id. at 32.
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tence exceeded, by eighteen days, the fixed one-time sentence which could
be imposed on objectors who expressed their objections at later stages, and
the applicant remained liable to complete his military service, irrespective of
his prison sentence.1 Finnish authorities expressed the opinion that "[I]t was
difficult to create a distinction between ... a conscript's purely conscien-
tious objection to performing military service and... 'classic' military of-
fenses with the aim of evading service."2" The Commission felt that, "[T]he
need to avoid such a distinction constituted a sufficiently legitimate aim.'2
The Commission held that the duration of the applicant's actual punishment
was not out of proportion with the State's legitimate aim."° Furthermore, as
a result of amendments to the law, the applicant was no longer required to
perform military service and could "no longer be sentenced for refusing to
perform any kind of service in peacetime. ' 3
F. Tsirlis and Kouloumpas v. Greece
In Tsirlis and Kouloumpas v. Greece,2" some of the members of the
Commission finally demonstrated a willingness to abandon their restrictive
approach to the rights of objectors and, more particularly, their approach to
the scope of Article 9. In Tsirlis, the applicants, ministers of the Jehovah's
Witnesses faith, made a request for exemption from military service on the
grounds that they were ministers of religion.2 5 Despite the fact that, under
Greek law, all ministers of "known religions" were exempt from military
service, and notwithstanding the fact that Jehovah Witnesses were accepted
as a known religion under Greek law," the applicants were not allowed an
exemption immediately. 7 The applicants, in fact, were detained while their
status was being determined.0 ' This treatment was different from the one re-
served for Orthodox ministers who were able to obtain exemptions without
difficulty. The applicants alleged they suffered discrimination and their reli-
gious rights had been violated."°9
The Commission first examined whether the applicants' allegations es-
tablished a violation of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 9. After recall-
199. Id.
200. Id. at 31.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 32.
203. Id.
204. Tsirlis & Kouloumpas v. Greece, App. No. 19233/91 & 19234/91, 21 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 30, 35 (1996). For a discussion of the case see Holly Cullen, Article 9-11 ECHR in
1995: A New Europe Approach to Fundamental Freedoms, 21 E. L. REv. 29 (1996) and
Holly Cullen, The Emerging Scope of Freedom of Conscience, 22 E. L. REv. 32 (1997).
205. Tsirlis & Kouloumpas, App No. 19233/91 & 19234/91, at 18-19.
206. Id. at 44.
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ing that the Convention "does not guarantee per se a right for religious min-
isters to be exempted from military service," the Commission observed that
Greek law "provides for such an exemption for ministers of 'known relig-
ions. '"""O As the aim of the exemption was "to enable ... ministers to per-
form uninhibited their religious functions," the subject matter of the appli-
cant's complaint clearly fell within the scope of Article 9 of the
Convention."' The applicants suffered discrimination because they were de-
tained before being exempted from military service. Furthermore, the appli-
cants' claims evidenced discrimination because the Greek government had
not contested or invoked any reasonable or objective justification to explain
difference in treatment of ministers of the Orthodox Church who could ob-
tain an exemption without any difficulty.2
Despite the applicants' allegations "that they were persecuted because
of their religious beliefs and that they were deprived, during their detention,
of every opportunity to perform their duties as religious ministers and prac-
tise their religion together with the other followers of their creed," ' 3 the
Commission stated that, "[I]n view of its opinion concerning Article 14 in
conjunction with Article 9 of the Convention," it was unnecessary to exam-
ine the case separately under Article 9."4
In partially dissenting opinions, Commissioners Liddy and Ress stated
that, even though they agreed the facts established a violation of Article 14
in conjunction with Article 9, it was necessary to examine the case under Ar-
ticle 9 taken by itself. t' As Commissioner Ress explained, "not every in-
fringement of the right of religion, . . . can be characterized as consisting
only of discrimination: such an interpretation would impose a subsidiary and
negligible role on the other rights guaranteed under the Convention. 2 6
While Commissioner Ress' opinion centered mainly on the need to ac-
cord sufficient weight to freedom of religion, Commissioner Liddy's judg-
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 44.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 45.
215. Id. at 46-47. Both dissenting commissioners were also of the opinion that the facts
confirmed interference with the rights guaranteed by Article 9. Commissioner Ress stated that
"since it appears that the ministers of the Jehovah's Witnesses are the specific target of the
military authorities, there is a further and separate violation of Article 9." Id. at 47. As for
Commissioner Liddy, she explained that "if the applicants had undertaken military service,
they would have been acting contrary to a fundamental tenet of their religion." Id. at 46. Their
only alternative was to "refuse to enlist and risk prosecution and detention, thus depriving
them of the opportunity to manifest their religion in community with others and in public, in
worship, teaching, practice and observance." Id. This lack of alternatives, argued Commis-
sioner Liddy, amounted to a "form of compulsion... [which] strikes at the very substance of
the freedom guaranteed. The freedom in this case is the freedom to manifest the ... religious
conviction of Jehovah's Witnesses by refraining from military service." Id.
216. id. at 47.
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ment focused on the substantive issue of conscientious objection."7 Liddy's
position was that Article 4(3)(b) did not exclude the possibility of examining
objection claims under Article 9 of the Convention."' In all instances, the
necessity for compulsory military or alternative service had to be considered
under Article 9(2).2"9 During such inquiry, the role of Article 4(3)(b) was to
extend "the margin of appreciation" of individual States.22 Commissioner
Liddy justified her conclusion by pointing out (1) that "the Convention does
not purport to recognise that States could arbitrarily impose compulsory
military service or alternative service; '221 (2) that "the formulation of Article
4(3)(b) ('any' service of a military character, 'in case of conscientious objec-
tors in countries where they are recognized') makes it clear that the framers
of the Convention did not assume that every country had a need for compul-
sory military service; ''222 and (3) that "Article 9 contains no express saver for
compulsory military or alternative service in its first paragraph, notwith-
standing the recognition in Article 4(3)(b) that questions of conscience could
arise concerning military service, and notwithstanding the deliberate inser-
tion of a third 'saving' sentence in Article 10 (1). "1223
G. Spotl v. Austria
The Commission maintained its narrow approach regarding the rights of
objectors in Spotl v. Austria. 4 In Spotl, the applicant was ordered to perform
military service and filed a request for recognition as a conscientious objec-
tor. Although authorities excused him from the duty to perform military ser-
vice, they ordered him to perform substitute civilian service.22 ' The applicant
argued that compelled performance of civilian service constituted sexual
discrimination prohibited by Article 14 in conjunction with Article 4(2), be-
cause women were not subject to such substitute civilian service.
The Commission first examined whether the applicant could rely on Ar-
ticle 14 in conjunction with Article 4(2) to contest the obligation to perform
217. Cullen, supra note 204, at 41.
218. Tsirlis & Kouloumpas, App. No. 19233/91 & 19234/91, at 47. Commissioner Liddy
referred to the concurring opinion of Mr. Eusthadiades in Grandrath to support her argument.
219. Id. at 46. In this case, Commissioner Liddy found "it unnecessary to consider
whether it [the interference] was 'necessary in a democratic society.' Given the particular
status of the applicants as ministers of a known religion, and the Commission's finding of
unlawfulness under Article 5(1), it [could not] be said that the interference was 'prescribed by
law' for the purpose of Article 9(2)." Id. at 46-47.
220. Id. at 47.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 47 (brackets in original).
223. Id.
224. Spotl v. Austria, App. No. 22956/93, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. 88 (1996).
225. Id.
226. Id. at 89. In Austria, only men had the obligation to perform military service. In
1991, the Austrian Constitutional Court decided that the exclusion of women from military
service was consistent with the Austrian Constitution. Id.
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civilian service. The government argued that in order to invoke a violation of
Article 14, the facts at issue had to fall within the ambit of another provision
of the Convention. The problem, according to Austrian authorities, was that
"under paragraph 3(b) of Article 4, the entire [question] of military and al-
ternative non-military service is excluded from the scope of the Conven-
tion.' 
,227
In rejecting the government's argument, the Commission noted
"[P]aragraph 3 of Article 4 was not intended to limit the exercise of the right
guaranteed by paragraph 2, but to 'delimit' the very content of that right."'228
Paragraph 3 had to be read in conjunction with paragraph 2, since it indi-
cated what the term 'forced or compulsory labor' does not include.229As the
Commission explained:
The limitations permitted, particularly any national legislation concerning
compulsory military service and substitute service by conscientious objec-
tors, must satisfy the requirements of Article 14, that is to say, be non-
discriminatory both in their character and in their application.
2 30
It therefore followed that, in conjunction with Article 4(2) and (3)(b),
Article 14 applied to the facts of the case. 3
While the commission decreed that the applicant could invoke gender
discrimination arguments to contest his obligation to perform civilian duty, it
also affirmed no violation of Article 14 was proven.2 32 This was because the
difference in treatment between men and women with regard to the obliga-
tion to perform military service,2 33 to which the obligation to perform civilian
service was an accessory obligation, was justified by objective reasons."5
These reasons included the existence of a common standard among contract-
ing States of excluding women from mandatory military service235 and a pol-
227. Id. at 90.
228. Id. Compare European Convention, supra note 1, Article 4(2) "No one shall be re-
quired to perform forced or compulsory labour," with Article 4(3)(b) "'Forced or compulsory
labour' shall not include... service exacted instead of military service."




233. Id. "The Commission note[d] that the... [complaint was] essentially about gender
discrimination with regard to the obligation under Austrian law to perform civilian service."
Id. However, "in view of the fact that women are not obliged to perform military service,"
because civilian service replaces military service, "they are not in the same situation as men."
Id.
234. Id. at91.
235. Id. As the Commission explained, "[s]uch a standard takes into account continuing
traditions in the field of national military defense, the opinion of the people, and the public
interest in maintaining an effective national defense system of those Contracting States which,
like Austria, have based their system of national defense on compulsory military service." Id.
34
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 32, No. 1 [2001], Art. 2
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol32/iss1/2
2001] CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION TO MILITARY SERVICE 35
icy of according a wide margin of appreciation to contracting States in the
organization of their national defenses. 36
IV. CONCLUSION
An examination of the jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee
and of the Commission on Human Rights reveals that both organizations
have adopted similar, if not identical, instances on the question of the exis-
tence of a right of conscientious objection to military service. The similarity
of these positions may be explained, in part, by the fact that both organs
have interpreted comparable texts. Indeed, not only do the European Con-
vention and the International Covenant include general articles guaranteeing
freedom of thought, conscience and religion, but more importantly, they
both contain articles that declare service of a military character does not con-
stitute forced or compulsory labour. Both organs have affirmed that two
conclusions inevitably follow from the wording of Article 8 of the Interna-
tional Covenant and Article 4 of the European Convention.237 First, because
the provisions speak of conscientious objectors "in countries where they are
recognized," contracting States have no obligation to acknowledge and to
exempt conscientious objectors from compulsory military service. Secondly,
because the articles make express provision for substitute service, it follows
that when States choose to recognize objectors and allow them to perform
alternative obligations in lieu of military service, objectors cannot claim, un-
der Articles 9 or 18, exemption from such service.
When the Covenant and the Convention were drafted and when the
Committee and the European Commission started examining the question of
a right of objection to military service, acceptance of the existence of such a
right was far from universal.3 The question of whether individuals could
object to military service was still perceived by most States as essentially a
political question, not as an issue involving deep convictions. The early de-
cisions of both organs, which established that under the Covenant and the
Convention, recognition of a right of objection rested in the hands of each
State, were undoubtedly influenced by and predicated on the fact that few
States acknowledged the validity of objection claims within their national
laws.
Just as a change of attitude among nations is now occurring, as wit-
nessed by the number of States which recognize the validity of conscientious
236. Id. See Cullen, supra note 204, at 42 (arguing that the decision "leaves no room for
the review of conscription policy, or potentially any matter relating to the organization of the
armed forces, by the Convention organs").
237. See also JACOBS & WHITE, supra note 134, at 217 and TAHZIB, supra note 85, at
282.
238. TAHZIB, supra note 85, at 353. Had a right of objection been universally accepted,
the phrase "in countries where conscientious objection is recognized" would probably not
have been inserted. Id.
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claims and provide for alternative services,239 so too must the position of the
European Commission on Human Rights (and its successor-the European
Court of Human Rights)2" and U.N. Human Rights Committee. Fortunately,
encouraging signs are emanating from both organizations. In General Com-
ment 22, the Committee gave voice to the idea that a right of conscientious
objection could be "derived from Article 18,"24' and in her partially dissent-
ing opinion in Tsirlis, Commissioner Liddy expressed the opinion that it was
possible to interpret the Convention in such a manner as to recognize a right
of objection.42 In its 1993 resolution, the European Parliament also stated,
"conscientious objection to military service is inherent in the concept of
freedom of thought, conscience and religion, as recognized in Article 9 of
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedom."243 The resolution made clear the European Parliament, "is
convinced that the right of conscientious objection derives from the human
rights and fundamental freedoms which the European Union undertakes to
respect pursuant to Article F(2) of the [EU] Treaty and, therefore, that the
harmonization of legislation in this field falls within the competence of the
European Community."'2" Article 10, paragraph 2 of the Charter of Funda-
mental Rights of the European Union also stipulates, "the right to conscien-
239. Gianella, supra note 10, at 1412-13.
240. See Protocol No. 11 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, restructuring the control machinery established thereby,
May 11, 1994, Europ. T.S. No. 155. Protocol No. 11 entered into force on November 1, 1998.
Pursuant to Protocol No. 11, the Commission will continue to exist until October 31, 1999.
241. HRI/GEN/l/Rev.1, supra note 26, General Comment 22, at 39.
242. Tsirlis & Kouloumpas v. Greece, App. Nos. 19233/91 & 19234/91, 21 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 30, 46-47 (1996). Although the Commission, in its jurisprudence, has been reluctant to
recognize the existence of a right of objection to military service, other organs of the Council
of Europe have called for acknowledgment of such a right. For example, in 1967, the Consul-
tative Assembly of the Council of Europe adopted Resolution 337 "on the right of conscien-
tious objection," which inferred from Article 9 the principle that "persons liable to conscrip-
tion for military service who, for reasons of conscience or profound conviction arising from
religious, ethical, moral, humanitarian, philosophical or similar motives, refuse to perform
armed service shall enjoy a personal right to be released from the obligation to perform such
service." This resolution was subsequently presented to the Council of Europe's Committee
of Ministers in Recommendation 478. See Amnesty International, Special Action for Consci-
entious Objectors in Western Europe, Circular 2, 1979, at 3. See also Recommendation 816
(1977), supra note 45. In 1987, the Committee of Ministers also adopted recommendation
R(87) which stated that "anyone liable to conscription for military service who, for compel-
ling reasons of conscience, refuses to be involved in the use of arms, shall have the right to be
released from the obligation to perform such service, on the conditions set out thereafter."
COUNCIL OF EUROPE, supra note 44, at 184-85. The Steering Committee for Human Rights is
now conducting an assessment of the implementation of recommendation (87)8 with a view
to identifying what further action might be called for at the European level. See Written Ques-
tion No. 366 on the rights of conscientious objectors in Greece, 39 Y.B. EUR. CoNY. ON H.R.
522 (1996).
243. E.P Res. A3-411/93, supra note 51, at 5, A. See also Amnesty International, Out
of the Margins: The Right to Conscientious Objection to Military Service in Europe, supra
note 39, at *6.
244. E.P. Res. A3-0411/93, supra note 51, 6.
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tious objection is recognised, in accordance with the national laws governing
the exercise of this right. 245
While these statements constitute steps in the right direction, they are
insufficient. Not only does the Committee not mention, in General Comment
22, that it is setting aside its previous rulings, but the Comment itself con-
cludes with the familiar refrain, "when this right is recognized by law or
practice"-thus sending the message that States need not recognize a right of
objection.4 6 Similarly, although Commissioner Liddy argues for a reinterpre-
tation of the different provisions of the Convention so as to recognize a right
of objection, her opinion is merely one of dissent.
True respect for the conscience of all individuals will occur only once
the Committee and the Commission unambiguously affirm that a right of ob-
jection to military service can be derived from Article 9 of the Convention
and Article 18 of the Covenant. Acknowledgment that the Covenant and the
Convention protect a right of objection would ensure those States which re-
fuse to recognize the validity of objection claims would shoulder the burden
of justification.' Justification for non-recognition would be rendered more
difficult in that many States currently provide for a right of objection.
Direct involvement of the Commission and the Committee in an as-
sessment of the reasons invoked for refusal of acknowledgment of the right
of objection will signify greater protection for objectors only if both organi-
zations agree to truly scrutinize the reasons invoked by States. If too much
deference is shown to States regarding the reasons invoked for non-
recognition of the right of objection, the situation of objectors will remain
the same and objectors will continue to be imprisoned for their beliefs. 8 Be-
245. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 10(2), 2000 O.J. (C
364/01).
246. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.3, supra note 26, General Comment 22, at 39. According to David
Hams and Sarah Joseph, inclusion of these words implies that "such recognition is not actu-
ally guaranteed under the Covenant." DAVID J. HARRIS & SARAH JOSEPH, THE INTERNATIONAL
COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS AND UNITED KINGDOM LAW 160 (1995). The au-
thors argue that the ambiguous drafting of the comment "resulted from a wish to avoid arous-
ing opposition from State parties, and misgivings on the part of Committee members over the
propriety of unambiguously recognizing a right of conscientious objection." Id. But see
TAHZIB, supra note 85, at 357-58 (arguing that inclusion of the word "can" indicates "that this
is not a permissive provision for States").
247. Justification would be done by reference to one of the restriction grounds found in
the second paragraph of Article 9 of the Convention or the third paragraph of Article 18 of the
Covenant. For a contrary position see The Question of Conscientious Objection to Military
Service: Letter dated 22 April 1998 from the Permanent Representatives of Singapore to the
United Nations Office at Geneva addressed to the Chairman of the Commission on Human
Rights, U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n on Hum. Rts., 53d Sess., Agenda Item 22, 3, U.N. Doc.
E/CN. 4/1998/173 (1998). In a letter addressed to the Commission on Human Rights, twelve
delegations maintained that States need not justify their non-recognition of a right of objec-
tion because "where a State has established a compulsory military system under which every
citizen is legally required to serve military service, it is then a question of equality before the
law." Id. If one group, for whatever reason, was allowed to be excluded from military service,
this would compromise the universality of the application of the law.
248. Individuals denied the status of objector, but refuse to perform military service or
20011
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cause objectors can serve their State's interests and contribute to society by
performance of alternative services, the temptation to automatically accept
as sufficient any justification for non-recognition should be reduced.
A more liberal interpretation of the Convention and Covenant would en-
sure the jurisprudence of the Committee and Commission would be more in
line with the resolutions of the United Nations Commission on Human
Rights. A unified and consistent message by international bodies would
make it extremely difficult, both politically and legally, for individual States
to refuse to recognize the rights of objectors. International efforts could then
concentrate on the development of an equitable procedural system for ob-
taining conscientious objector status and on the establishment of guidelines
in the area of substitute services.
individuals who refuse to carry out alternative services to which they object are often severely
penalized. See, E/CN.4/1997/99, supra note 5, at 46-51 (listing punishments by country).
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